Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 51 | Issue 5

Article 8

6-1-1976

Introductory Comments
John Paul Stevens

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John P. Stevens, Introductory Comments, 51 Notre Dame L. Rev. 985 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol51/iss5/8

This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

INTRODUCTORY
COMMENTS
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS
United States Supreme Court Justice
for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
As the recently designated Circuit Justice for the Seventh Circuit, and as
a longtime admirer of the continuously improving quality of the Notre Dame
Law School, it is a distinct privilege to be allowed to make an introductory comment in the introductory issue containing a critique of the work of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
My comment is necessarily made without having had an opportunity to read
what appears on the ensuing pages. Nevertheless, I confidently predict that the
appraisals contained therein will make a significant contribution to the development of the law for at least three reasons: They will bring to the profession
greater awareness of the quality and scope of the work being performed by one of
the truly great courts in the country; they will demonstrate that there is a substantial basis for believing that some important issues have not yet been
completely understood and therefore may require further analysis and consideration; they will remind the judges that there really is a significant audience-other
than the litigants themselves-listening carefully to what they have to say. In
these ways, as well as others, this issue, like the judges' opinions, will plant seeds
that will add to the process of growth and change that is characteristic of our
jurisprudence.

HONORABLE THOMAS E. FAIRCHILD
Chief Judge for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

CHIEF JUDGE THOMAS E. FAIRCHILD

United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
The Notre Dame Lawyer's initial Seventh Circuit Review is a welcome addition to the growing number of scholarly analyses of the product of the federal
courts. This study will serve to focus the attention of lawyer and layman on the
role of the courts of appeal within the federal judicial system. The Seventh
Circuit is honored that its work is being scrutinized by such an able group of
commentators. In addition, the federal judiciary is continuously seeking to
maintain a perspective on its own work product, both with respect to consistency
and clarity of thought and in relation to the precedent and policy of other
judicial bodies. The judges of the Seventh Circuit are grateful to the Notre
Dame Lawyer for placing this perspective within our reach.
Legal scholarship concerning the federal courts has been devoted primarily
to the work of the Supreme Court. Understandably, analyses have traditionally
focused at the pinnacle. We think, however, that systematic and scholarly study
of the lower federal courts can make a significant contribution. Many principles
are stated, and policies and trends exposed in opinions which are not reviewed
by the High Court. For this reason alone the examination of the work of a
circuit is a valuable addition to legal scholarship.
The growing case load of the courts of appeal has made the task of maintaining a high standard of legal research and reasoning in appellate opinions
more difficult. Consequently, federal judges must also strive harder to perceive
new trends and policies within their own circuits as well as in others. A critical
analysis of our year's work serves to facilitate our full appreciation of the scope
of the decisions of the panels of our court and furnishes us with a perspective of
the Seventh Circuit within the context of the federal judicial system. I express
the thanks of our judges for providing us with this important study.
Yet, introductory comments are often laced with platitudes focusing on the
significance of the work without critically examining the role which the work
plays. Too often kind words are directed without recognition of purpose.
Clearly, the planning and writing of a review of court decisions precludes such a
convenience. The primary purpose behind a review is to serve the courts, practicing counsel, and students alike by accurately analyzing the "cutting edge of the
law." For the authoring court, a review provides an erudite exposition and
analysis of its decisions, subjecting to scrutiny the premises, the criteria, and the
policies which underlie the judicial decision-making. For the practicing bar, a
review offers a perspective on the decisions rendered, by not only placing them
within their proper developmental framework, but also by offering predictive
guidelines by which new cases might be successfully advocated. Finally, for the
student, the review provides the penultimate opportunity to commit his rigorous
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academic training to appraise those issues most nearly reflective of contemporary
societal concerns. It is to these particular ends that the Notre Dame Lawyer's
Seventh Circuit Review is directed.
In satisfying its basic objective, the Seventh Circuit Review must often
expose those decisions, the significance of which is not apparent on their face.
Frequently, new attitudes or approaches of statutory construction, constitutional
principles, or practical effects do not reveal their impact unless carefully screened
and evaluated. Only in proper context do many decisions reveal the value judgments implicitly made by reviewing courts. Yet to expose a decision without
providing complementary analysis is to raise giant edifices without proper foundation. The review must analyze each decision, intrinsically on its own merits, as
well as extrinsically looking to its effect. In the former inquiry, the examination
must discern whether the conclusion rests upon appropriate and well-reasoned
premises; it must focus on whether the specific criteria used are those to which an
appellate court should give judicial weight. Finally, it must decide whether this
controversy is an area where policy notions should prevail over sophisticated legal
maneuvering. With respect to the extrinsic factor, the review must appraise
whether the Seventh Circuit decision is consistent with extant law, and if not,
whether the deviation is warranted under the circumstances; it must be articulately examined and the rationales for decision appraised. Finally, it must look to
responses by other circuits and determine whether the result is predicated upon a
common perception, or is grounded in factual circumstances peculiar to the case
confronting the Seventh Circuit. Only when these considerations are properly
evaluated does a review serve the purpose which justifies its existence-and
recognition.
One area of importance to me, by inclination as well as by profession, is the
concern with the professional competence of the practicing bar. Comments made
by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court echo the sentiments of
many jurists with regard to the proficiency of trial counsel. Elsewhere concerns
mount with regard to the reduction in time-or eventual elimination-of the
role of oral argument on appeal. To generate educated discussion in this area, as
well as to provide some framework against which to choose values, this initial
Seventh Circuit Review highlights some of our recent decisions dealing with the
legal profession. Questions concerning the standard of competence used to
evaluate lawyers in determining whether Sixth Amendment guarantees have been
satisfied are raised and answered. Other issues regarding the input and impact
of the judge on the actual trial are considered and responded to. These inquiries
are of critical import if we truly are to subscribe to the notion that there is substance, that there is significance to concepts of due process of law and effective
representation of counsel. By coming to grips with these difficulties we play
the necessary role which this honored profession holds out to us. To the end that
this review generates interest in these areas, and provides competent instruction
as framework with which to proceed, I welcome its audacity and applaud its
success.
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HONORABLE LUTHER M. SWYGERT
Former Chief Judge for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

FORMER CHIEF JUDGE LUTHER M. SWYGERT
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
The Notre Dame Lawyer is to be commended for publishing a review of
the recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Such a review has multiple benefits. It calls the attention of both the
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legal academic community and the practicing bar to important decisions of the
court and provides a critique of them. It also serves as a means for criticizing the
work of the court and detecting trends that might otherwise be overlooked.
The Lawyer's invitation to write a comment is appreciated and I am pleased
to comply. The purpose in writing this comment is not, however, to discuss cases
decided by the court during the past year-that, I fear, would be an exercise of
supererogation-rather, I wish to write about a few of the salutary and innovative procedures that the Seventh Circuit has developed during recent years.
Circuit Rule 28-PublicationPlan for Decisions
For quite some time the court has had a rule regarding publication of opinions which has produced both praise and criticism from the bar. In essence it
provides two methods for the disposition of cases: (1) published opinions, either
authored or per curiam and (2) unpublished orders.' A conservative estimate is
that about forty percent of our decisions are by order. The term "order" does not
mean a bare statement that the action of the district court or agency is either
affirmed or reversed. It includes a statement of the facts and the reasons for the
decision. It may be a single page or several pages in length. The rule provides
that the order may not be cited as a precedent within the circuit. The reason for
this proscription is that the court does not view orders as having any precedential
value and therefore they would serve only as cumulative secondary material in
support of a position taken by one of the parties to the appeal. Noncitation is
essential to any plan for unpublished orders. If citation were permitted, governmental agencies and large law firms would have an advantage over those practitioners who could not afford the purchase of all the orders that are issued.
Circuit Rule 24-Elimination of Appendices
Rule 30(f) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a
court of appeals may by rule dispense with the requirement of an appendix in
all cases and permit appeals to be heard on the original record. Pursuant to this
provision the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has by rule
(Rule 24) eliminated the requirement of appendices in all cases. In lieu thereof
we suggest that the parties include as part of their brief the memorandum
decision of the district court, the trial court's findings if there was a bench trial,
pertinent provisions of the agreement if a contract is involved, a copy of the
patent if it is a patent case, and similar material in other cases. Also, if some
part of the testimony or evidence is particularly important it may be included
in the back of the brief or by separate short appendix. A proposed revised rule
currently being considered by the court would mandate the inclusion of the
decision by the trial court or agency.
I See Hastings, The Seventh Circuit Plan for Publication of Opinions-A Continuing
Experiment, 51 Ind. L. J. 2 (1976) pp. 368-69.
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SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

The court in fact does not welcome bulky appendices of the record. They
are expensive for the parties and their utility is minimal since all the judges have
their chambers in Chicago and the original record is readily available to them.
Because the abbreviated material from the record is often included in the
brief as an addendum, perhaps it is pertinent to say something about the briefs.
The court does not require printed briefs. Before the advent of photocopy,
briefs were either printed or typewritten in pauperis cases. Presently, however,
about one half of the briefs are being submitted by the use of photocopy.
Rule 33, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure-DocketingConferences
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure authorizes a court of
appeals to conduct a "prehearing conference" to consider the "simplification of
the issues and such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the proceedings
by the court." Pursuant to that rule the Seventh Circuit has been conducting
docketing conferences during the past three years in all criminal appeals and
since early 1975 in a large number of civil appeals. Conferences with out-of-town
counsel are conducted by telephone, while conferences with Chicago counsel
are held in chambers.
A date is fixed for the filing of the record, including any necessary transcript
of the testimony. This date is usually shorter than the time prescribed by Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Definite dates are also set for the
filing of briefs. These dates, although sometimes shorter than the time periods
required by the rules, are actually tailored to fit the particular needs of the case
as well as the hearing schedule of the court. The parties are also advised as to the
approximate date of the oral argument.
Thus the conferences result in a definite procedural schedule for each individual case. Additional benefits from the conferences have been occasional
dismissals of appeals because of lack of appellate jurisdiction, the elimination of
repetitious argument through joint or staggered briefs, and the explanation of
practices and procedures to lawyers new to the court of appeals. In civil cases
settlement possibilities are discussed. The procedural schedule decided at the
conference is incorporated in an order furnished to counsel, the district judge, the
clerk of the district court, and, if applicable, the court reporter.
These are not all the procedures and rules that the court has developed
over recent years in an effort to expedite its work and to improve the appellate
process. They are, however, some of the more important.
Appellate courts should have twin goals: to make appeals as inexpensive,
easy, and expeditious as possible and, second, to decide cases consistent with the
traditions of the common law. Because constant changes in our economic,
political, and social systems are inevitable, the law, if it is to serve its high purpose
as a means for resolving problems that these changes bring, must be kept viable
and responsive. For that reason it is important that appellate judges in shaping
the law adopt a philosophy that nurtures viability and responsiveness for procedural as well as substantive law.
To adhere to precedent when appropriate, but to refine the old or create
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anew when demanded by the changing flux of life defines the responsibilities of
appellate judges. For, as Cardozo wrote, judges must distinguish between the
precedents which are merely static and those which are dynamic. It is my
belief that the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit as a collegial institution are meeting this responsibility.

